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Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Privacy: Moral Ideals in
the Constitution?
Joel Feinberg*
Seventy-five years after Lochner v. New York 1 most of us are prepared to cheer Holmes' famous quip that the Constitution does not
enact Herbert Spencer's SocialStatics. But does the Constitution stay
neutral with respect to all conflicting social philosophies? Until recently, the direction of United States Supreme Court decisions encouraged many liberals to think that perhaps the first amendment
enacts John Stuart Mill's On Liberty. In addition, philosophers might
suggest (if we were not so diffident) that the eighth amendment incorporates Immanuel Kant's philosophy of punishment, and the
fourteenth amendment presupposes the framework of Aristotle's theory of justice. Holmes' sarcastic term "enact," of course, is misleading as a name for the relation between the Constitution and a
particular social philosophy. Politically impotent philosophy professors may be entitled to their power fantasies, but they are not so deluded to think of themselves as actual legislators of the law of the
land. It would be much less misleading to claim only that the Constitution, insofar as it uses fundamental ethical terms without explicitly stating how to interpret them, tacitly incorporates some
particular moral theories, namely the most plausible ones. The idea
is that certain philosophical accounts of liberty, justice, equality, and
fair dealing are closer to the objective truth than others, and the
Constitution embodies the correct accounts of these moral notions,
whatever they should happen to be. You will not be surprised to
learn that, as a professional philosopher, I am disposed to be sympathetic to this approach, despite some obvious difficulties, since it
makes moral philosophy the foundation of constitutional jurispru*
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1 198 U.S. 45 (1905). In Lochner, the Supreme Court held that a New York statute
limiting employment in bakeries to sixty hours a week and ten hours a day was an arbitrary
interference with the freedom to contract guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment. The
statute, the Court held, could not be sustained as a valid exercise of the state's police power to
protect the public's safety, morals, or welfare.
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dence, so that one cannot fully understand the latter without studying the former.
In these two lectures, I propose to look at a moral concept that
the Supreme Court has found lurking in various shadowy crevices of
the Bill of Rights, and that the Court has said to be presupposed
somehow by the rights that are explicitly guaranteed in that document. The Court itself has used the unfortunate term "privacy" for
this foundational idea, but philosophers, reading between the lines of
the leading judicial opinions, have had no difficulty identifying it as
the concept we have often called personal autonomy 2 or self-determination-a notion that has puzzled philosophers for centuries and divided them into contending schools. I would like to suggest a
different way (I hesitate to say a "new way"-nothing seems new in
this well-trampled field) of looking at and applying this moral concept. Whether my approach, or any purely philosophical approach,
can have any utility for constitutional interpretation, I must leave for
others to say.
I.

Autonomy as Sovereignty

A. PersonalAutonomy Conceived on the Model of National Sovereignty
The word "autonomy" is derived from the Greek stems for
"self" and "law" and means literally "the having or making of one's
own laws." Its sense therefore can be rendered at least approximately by such terms as "self-rule," "self-determination," "self-government," and "independence." These phrases are all familiar to us
from their more frequent, and often more exact, application to states
and other political institutions. Indeed it is plausible to suppose that
the original applications and denials of these notions were to states
and that their attribution to individuals is derivative, in which case
"personal autonomy" is a political metaphor.3
2 Cf. Elizabeth L. Beardsley, ,Pivag.-Autonomy and Selective Disclosure, and Hyman Gross,
Privag and Autonomy, in NOMOS XIII: PRIVACY 56-70 & 169-81 (1971) (Beardsley characterizes autonomy as one distinct facet of privacy; Gross treats autonomy and privacy as separate,
but easily confused, concepts).
3 The Oxford English Dictionary lists three senses of "autonomy." The first and oldest
is political, the other two are biological and social. The first is: "Of a state, institution, etc.:
The right of self-government, of making its own laws and administering its own affairs." The
earliest cited use of the word in English is in this sense (1623). Plato, when referring to "the
ruling part of the soul" in THE REPUBLIC, quite self-consciously creates a political metaphor.
C.S. Lewis writes that the Greek eleutheria and the Latin libertas, which are usually translated
as "freedom," were used in ancient times "chiefly, if not entirely, in reference to the freedom
of a state. The contrast implied is sometimes between autonomy and subjection to a foreign
power; sometimes between the freedom of [within] a republic and the rule of a despot." If
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When applied to individual persons the word "autonomy" can
refer to either (i) the capacity to govern oneself, which of course is a
matter of degree; or (ii) the actual condition of self-government and its
associated virtues; or (iii) an ideal of character derived from that conception; or (iv) (on the analogy to a political state) the sovereign authority to govern oneself, which is absolute within one's own moral
"boundaries." '4 This fourth sense of "autonomy," the one to which
we shall devote our attention here, is suggested by the language of
international law in which autonomous nation-states are said to have
the sovereign right of self-determination. It has become common in
recent years, however, for "autonomy" and "sovereignty" to be distinguished in political discourse. Great Britain is a sovereign nation
which may under certain circumstances be willing to grant more "local autonomy," but never full sovereignty, to its constituent parts,
Wales and Scotland. Similarly, Egyptians and Israelis negotiate
greater "autonomy" (or home rule) for the west bank Palestinians.
Sometimes the word used for the granting of limited "autonomy" is
"devolution" in the sense of "the delegation of portions or details of
duties to subordinate [local] officers or committees."' 5 In any case,
whatever the word used, the concept is sharply contrasted with that
of full national sovereignty. If Scotland were to win sovereignty, it
would become an entirely separate and independent nation.
Sovereignty and (mere) political autonomy seem to differ in at
least two respects. First, autonomy is partial and limited, while sovereignty is whole and undivided. The autonomous region governs
itself in some respects but not in others, whereas the sovereign state
does not relinquish its right to govern entirely when it delegates auLewis is right, one of the oldest, if not the original, sense of "free" is "autonomous" as applied
to a state, a sense which still survives. See C.S. LEwis, STUDIES IN WORDS 124-25 (1961).
4 Note that corresponding to these families of meanings of "autonomous," there are
parallel senses of the term "independent": the capacity to support oneself, direct one's own
life, and be finally responsible for one's own decisions; or the defacto condition of self-sufficiency
which consists in the exercise of the appropriate capacities when the circumstances permit; or
the ideal of self-sufficiency; or the sense, applied mainly to political states, which refers to de
jure sovereignty and the right of self-determination.
The word "free" is more complicated, but it too has an ambiguity similar to that of
"autonomous" and "independent," especially when applied to nations and states. When colonies achieve independence of an imperial power they are said to have won their freedom,
though their citizens may not be any freer as individuals. When we speak of people as (generally) free or unfree, we can mean either that they are generally capable of acting or omitting
to act as they please (defacto freedom) or that they are independent, "sovereign" beings,
persons in actual and/or rightful control of their own choices. See J. FEINBERG, The Idea of a
Free Man, in RIGHTS, JUSTICE, AND THE BOUNDS OF LIBERTY 3-29 (1980).
5 THE SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 497 (2d ed. 1936).
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tonomy. When the state grants home rule to a regional section, its
own ultimate authority is not diminished, since in devolution sovereignty is not something given away in divisible parcels. (On the
other hand, if the state intends to give away some of its sovereignty it
has a sovereign right to do that too, as the United Kingdom did when
it recognized the independence of India.)
A more important difference is that the authority of the sovereign state is a right, whereas the authority of the autonomous region
is a revocable privilege. The sovereign grants autonomy freely at his
pleasure and withdraws it at his will. Local autonomy is delegated;
sovereignty is primal and underivative. Sovereignty is, in a sense, an
ultimate source of authority.
Because of the special sense assigned to the word "autonomy" in
political discourse, I prefer to borrow the stronger term "sovereignty"
for what is often called "moral autonomy"; but where I do use the
word autonomy in what follows, I intend it simply to mean "personal
sovereignty," not something analogous to the weaker kind of "local
autonomy." Now we can proceed to examine carefully the analogy
between sovereign nations and "sovereign persons."
Most theories of sovereignty are about the concept of sovereignty in the state rather than our concern, the sovereignty of the
state. According to the theory deriving from Bodin and Hobbes and
developed by Blackstone, Austin and Dicey, there is (on some versions) or ought to be (on others) a determinate source of ultimate
authority and/or power in every state-a monarch, council, legislature, or electorate. This sovereign person, or body of persons, is the
"uncommanded commander" of society. This theory has had more
and more difficulty in its applications to modern states with their
constitutional checks and balances, their universal electorates, and
counterpoised social classes. But while the concept of the determinate internal sovereign has fallen out of favor, the concept of national sovereignty vis a vis external powers continues to be applied
routinely in international forums. Sovereignty in this sense is what
one nation "recognizes" in another when it acknowledges that the
other is an independent nation, as opposed to an empty territory, or
land occupied only by roving tribes without stable political institutions, or a regional segment or colony of another country.
Empty territory is not a state, but a political state is territory
and more. The additional element is best expressed by the term "jurisdiction." A sovereign state is territory under a kind of unconditional and absolute jurisdiction. The assertion that "the state is
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sovereign," according to Bernard Crick, is "usually a tautology, just
as the expression 'sovereign state' can be a pleonasm. For the concept of 'the state' came into use at about the same time as the concept of sovereignty, and it served the same purpose and had
substantially the same meaning."'6 The state is the juridical entity
that maintains sovereignty over a territory, no matter how its own
internal lines of authority are organized, and sovereignty is the form
of legal control a state exercises over its territory. Thus we mention
"sovereignty" in the very definition of a state, and we mention
"state" in the very definition of sovereignty.
Perhaps the concept of a "nation" can take us further toward an
understanding of the conceptual complex "sovereign-state." Here we
must proceed with caution for the word "nation" is treacherously
vague and ambiguous. Sometimes it is still used interchangeably
with "state"; "France" is the name of both a nation and a state.
That is probably its original usage, 7 but it can now be used also to
refer to the entity that can acquire its own state, and can be said to
deserve to be a state even before it actually is one. We can refer to
that second, and still obscure, sense of "nation" as the "prepolitical"
sense. In this sense a "nation" may exist before it acquires its own
state, or after it loses it, or it may exist in numerous states, as talk of
"the Arab nation" testifies. On the other hand, people of distinct
ethnic, linguistic, and religious backgrounds can co-exist as citizens of
the same nation because they use still other criteria for identifying
their fellow nationals. Such criteria include a shared focus in a common national self-image for sentiment and loyalty, or an extended
history of faithful support and collaboration. 8 Thus, "French, German, and Italian-speaking Swiss are simply three sorts of Swiss: their
national image transcends or embraces linguistic differences, and it
Bernard Crick, Sovereignty, 15 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCI77 (1968).
7 See S.I. BENN & R.S. PETERS, SOCIAL PRINCIPLES AND THE DEMOCRATIC STATE
(1959). They write there:
"The nation" is a relatively modern conception, just as nationalism is a modern political ideal. In the Middle Ages, men did not think of themselves as Englishmen, Frenchmen, or Germans, but as vassals of their overlord, subjects of their king,
and ultimately members of a universal order of Christendom. Gradually the
monarchs of Western Europe strengthened themselves against the Emperor and the
Pope on the one side and their barons on the other, each building up an increasingly centralized structure of political authority, and becoming a more important
focus for loyalty than any competitor. At this stage the idea of nationality [nationhood] was co-terminous with political allegiance.
Id at 247.
8 Id at 249.
6
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would be odd to make distinctions of nationality where they make
none themselves." 9
Where does a sovereign right of political independence come
from: dispensations? contracts? conquests? There is no single obviously correct answer for a question of this generality. Suffice it to
say, for our purposes, that apart from philosophical skeptics, nobody
in practice seriously questions that Peru is a sovereign nation with
the exclusive prerogative of governing its own territory, and the same
is true of all the other established national states. That is just what a
nation naturally is: a collection of individuals given a high degree of
unity by common cultural elements who in fact occupy a territory
over which they have established a system of law or authority. Nations need to become states if they are to survive and flourish as nations. And the phrase "sovereign state" is a redundancy.
If there is an analogous kind of personal sovereignty, where does
it come from? One way of looking at individuals is to regard them,
in a parallel way, as just naturally persons, and the phrase "sovereign
person" might also be a redundancy. In fact the word "person" has
an ambiguity directly parallel to that of the word "nation." "Nation" can refer, as we have seen, either to a judicial entity, the state,
or to a collection of individuals united by various kinds of cultural
bonds into a cohesive group. Similarly "person" can refer to the sort
of entity that is a proper subject of such moral predicates as "right"
and "duty,"10 or it can refer to the unity imposed on a diversity of
psychic elements-memories, loyalties, preferences, opinions-which
puts on them all the stamp of a single self." "One self" is the ana9 Id at 251.
10 1 discuss this sense of "person" under the rubric "normative personhood" and contrast
it with "descriptive" or "commonsense personhood" in Abortion, in MATTERS OF LIFE AND
DEATH 186-217 (T.Regan ed. 1978), and Human Duties andAnimal Rghe , in RIGHTS, JUSTICE
AND THE BOUNDS OF LIBERTY 191-93 (1980).
11 Cf R.B. PERRY, REALMS OF VALUE 62-63 (1954). We are persons (in the non-juridical sense), according to Perry, to the extent that our interests are integrated:
That which makes a man a person is the integration of his interests, both time-wise
and space-wise. The person can look ahead, and plan accordingly; he can launch
upon trains of purposive activities; he can relate his past to his future fortunes, and
the distant to the near; he can keep his bearings; he can manage the household of
his diverse interests; he can put first things first; he can hold in mind the wood,
despite the trees; and all this he can do because of his cognitive capacities.
A man is a person insofar as there is a central clearing-house where his interests...
take account of one another, and are allowed to proceed only when the demands of
other interests are consulted, and wholly or partially met.
Id Note how similar things might be said about the extent to which a group of people is "a
people," a "community," or a "nation."
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logue of "one people"; it provides the sense of "person" analogous to
the pre-political "nation." Indeed, most normal people have
achieved a degree of personal integration far stronger than that social
integration that unifies national groups. If anything, one would expect the case for a "natural" personal sovereignty to be even stronger
than that for its political counterpart. The other sense of person ("an
appropriate locus of rights and duties") is essentially juridical. It refers to a moral agent and possessor of rights, as "naturally sovereign"
over its self as the state is over its territory; and just as some have
argued that pre-political nations need to be (sovereign) states, so one
might argue, do integrated individual selves need to be (juridical)
persons.
A word of caution is required at this point. The system of nation-states has not always served the world well, as its sorry record of
wars attests. The walls of national sovereignty may weaken and
crumble as a sense of world community grows, nourished by increasing cultural homogeneity and spurred by a common dread of nuclear
holocaust. The case for individual sovereignty conceived on the national model, however, as we have seen, may well be stronger than
the partial analogy between persons and nations suggests, for where
that analogy fails, the differences tend to strengthen rather than
weaken the attribution of individual sovereignty. There are cases,
and not merely hypothetical ones, in which a sovereign state chooses
to exterminate a part of its own population, just as a sovereign individual person might choose to have one of his own limbs or organs
removed. But the morally crucial difference between these cases is
obvious. The "parts" of persons are themselves nonpersons: desires,
values, purposes, organs, limbs. The "parts" of nations, however, are
themselves persons with their own sovereign rights. A state may intervene in a neighboring state's internal affairs to protect the lives of
sovereign persons threatened with extermination, but a second party
may not interfere, in a parallel way, in a sovereign person's "internal
affairs" to protect the "rights" of desires, organs, and the like, for the
latter, being nonpersons, have no rights of their own. This is another
example of a difference between nations and persons that strengthens
the concept of personal sovereignty even as it weakens the concept of
national sovereignty which served as its model. What I have been
proposing here simply is that the individual be thought of in the
terms in whichfor better or worse we have thought of nations in the
past, and even if we cease thinking of nations in that way in the
future.
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Domain Boundaries

It must remain a matter of debate whether a concept of personal
sovereignty like that sketched above has any proper application to
individuals in the real world. I can only hope to show that the concept makes sense, that it stands ready for use as a tool of our moral
judgments if we want it. I shall now attempt to render it more explicit while still preserving its fit with a familiar segment of our moral
discourse in which something implicitly like it seems to be presupposed. In so doing, I shall be sketching as coherent a doctrine as I
can of sovereign self-rule applied to individuals. Obviously, argumentative uses of the doctrine both in law and morals will be effective only to the degree that the doctrine itself is persuasive.
Demonstration of the doctrine is not possible, but the reader may
find that it resonates with something in his most fundamental moral
attitudes-particularly some of the attitudes he holds toward himself.
Consider then once more our basic political analogy. In what
ways might the autonomous individual be analogous to the autonomous state? The politically independent state is said to be sovereign
over its own territory. Personal autonomy similarly involves the idea
of having a domain or territory in which the self is sovereign. But
whereas international conventions and treaties have long since defined the idea of "national territory" with some precision, the
"boundaries" of the personal domain are entirely obscure and controversial. To be sure, even the territorial boundaries of nations are
subject to some dispute and uncertainty, for example over how far up
into the atmosphere they extend, and how far off shore. But the concepts of political "sovereignty" and "territory" are clear enough to
permit international lawyers and diplomats to work on such
problems in nonarbitrary ways with every hope of success. In the
case of personal autonomy, no attempt to adjudicate "boundary disputes" can even be made until agreement is reached on the conceptual question of what a "personal domain" consists in.
The easiest answer is the one that takes the territorial metaphor
most seriously. A sovereign nation's territory is a geographical entity
measured in miles or kilometers, and coordinates on maps. Perhaps
the personal domain is also defined by its spatial dimensions. Perhaps it consists simply of a person's body. We do speak of an inviolate right which is infringed whenever another person inflicts a
harmful or offensive contact on one's body without one's consent-an
unwanted caress, a slap, a punch in the nose, a surgical operation, or
even a threatening move that provokes the reasonable apprehension
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of such contacts. That must be part of what we mean by personal
autonomy. After all, we speak of "bodily autonomy," and acknowledge its violation in cases of assault, battery, rape, and so on. But
surely our total autonomy includes more than simply our bodily "territory," and even in respect to it, more is involved than simple immunity to uninvited contacts and invasions. Not only is my bodily
autonomy violated by a surgical operation ("invasion") imposed on
me against my will; it is also violated in some circumstances by the
withholding of the physical treatment I request (when due allowance
has been made for the personal autonomy of the parties of whom the
request is made). For to say that I am sovereign over my bodily territory is to say that I, and I alone, decide (so long as I am capable of
deciding) what goes on there. My authority is a discretionary competence, an authority to choose and make decisions.
If a man or woman voluntarily chooses to have a surgical operation that will render him or her infertile and a physician is perfectly
willing to perform it, then the person's "bodily autonomy" is infringed if the state forbids it on some such ground as wickedness or
imprudence. If no other interests are directly involved, the decision is
the person's own and "nobody else's business," as we say, or "a matter between the person and his/her doctor only." To say that one's
body is included in one's sovereign domain then, is to say more than
that it cannot be treated in certain ways without one's consent. It is
to say that one's consent is both necessary and sufficient for its rightful treatment in those ways. The concept of a discretionary competence implies both negative rights (e.g., the right not to have surgery
imposed on one against one's will) and positive rights (e.g., the right
to have surgery performed on one if one voluntarily chooses-and
the surgeon is willing).
Still taking the territorial model seriously, we might enlarge our
conception of the personal domain to include not only one's body
(that is, one's right to decide by one's own choice insofar as that is
possible what happens in and to one's body), but also a certain
amount of "breathing space" around one's body, analogous perhaps
to offshore fishing rights in the national model. You can violate my
autonomy without actually touching my body, by entering and remaining, uninvited, in my personal space, or by transmitting into
that space unwanted spectacles, sounds, or odors. My right to determine by my own choice what enters my experience is one of the various things meant by the "right of privacy," and so interpreted that
right is one of the elements of my personal autonomy. My personal
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space, however, diminishes to the vanishing point when I enter the
public world. I cannot complain that my rights are violated by the
hurly burly, noise, and confusion of the busy public streets; I can
always retrace my steps if the tumultuous crowds are too much for
me. One difference, then, between personal and national "territory"
is that the former but not the latter shrinks and expands with differing circumstances. After all, national territories are not in constant
movement across the surface of the earth (except for the snail's pace
of continental drift which hardly affects the point). Where one has
one's domicile, however, and where one owns land, there one has
space that is entirely one's own, where uninvited intruders (with certain necessary and well understood exceptions) may not enter. Thus
contractual possession and land ownership are also defined by discretionary rights and form a part, but by no means the whole, of our
personal autonomy. On my land, apart from emergencies that bring
the public interest sharply into play, and comparable rights of my
landowning neighbors, I and I alone am the one who decides what is
to happen.
Even discretionary control of body, privacy, and landed property together do not exhaust a plausible conception of personal autonomy. The kernel of the idea of autonomy is the right to make
choices and decisions-what to put into my body, what contacts with
my body to permit, where and how to move my body through public
space, how to use my chattels and physical property, what personal
information to disclose to others, what information to conceal, and
more. Some of these rights are more basic and more plausibly
treated as indispensable than others. Put compendiously, the most
basic autonomy-right is the right to decide how one is to live one's
life, in particular how to make the critical life-decisions-what
courses of study to take, what skills and virtues to cultivate, what
career to enter, whom or whether to marry, which church if any to
join, whether to have children, and so on.
The first difficulty for a conception of a sovereign personal domain is the question of whether the imposing concept of "sovereignty" applies to the myriad options of lesser significance, the choice
of whether or not to fasten a seat belt, for example, or whether to
wear a red or green shirt while hunting. If we take the model of
national sovereignty seriously, we cannot make certain kinds of compromises with paternalism. We cannot say for example that interference with the relatively trivial self-regarding choices involves only
"minor forfeitures" of sovereignty whereas interference with the basic
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life-choices involves the virtual abandonment of sovereignty, for sovereignty is an all or nothing concept; one is entitled to absolute control of whatever is within one's domain however trivial it may be on
a scale of significance or harmfulness. In the political model, a nation's sovereignty is equally infringed by a single foreign fishing boat
in its territorial waters as by a squadron of jet fighters flying over its
capital city. Both are equally violations of sovereign rights, though
the one, of course, is a more serious or important infringement than
the other. If the offending nation respects the sovereignty of the
other nation, it respects all of it, and will not think ofjustifj'ing its
infringement on the ground that the invasion of sovereignty was relatively trivial and counterbalanced by considerations of convenience
or efficiency. Only a nation's own sovereignty (in the guise, say, of
"self-defense") may ever be placed on the scales and weighed against
another nation's acknowledged sovereignty, for sovereignty decisively
outweighs every other kind of reason for intervention.
If the liberal wishes to abandon his quarrels with the paternalist
over statutes requiring seat belts, red shirts, and other trivial things,
and build his wall against paternalism on more serious issues, he is
well advised then not to say that the relatively trivial statutes are
only minor invasions of autonomy, and that autonomy-infraction is a
matter of degree suitable for the weighing scales. It would make better sense conceptually to draw the boundaries of personal sovereignty
differently in the first place, so that they confer their absolute protection only on the critical life-decisions.
My personal domain then consists of my body, privacy, landed
and chattel property, and at least the vital life-decisions, perhaps
among other things. But where exactly are its "territorial boundaries" drawn? A natural starting place for the attempt to draw domain boundaries is that suggested by the famous "harm to others"
principle of John Stuart Mill.1 2 According to this principle, as Mill

expands it, we may locate within the personal domain all those decisions that are "self-regarding," that is, those decisions that primarily
and directly affect only the interests of the decision-maker. Outside
the personal domain are all those decisions that are also other-regarding, that is, these decisions that directly and in the first instance affect
the interests of other persons. Clear examples of wholly self-regarding decisions are not easy to come by because "no man is an island,"
and every decision is bound to have some "ripple-effect" on the inter12 J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY (Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1956). This work was originally published
in 1859.

THE NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW

[February 19831

ests of others. As Mill pointed out, 13 however, a rough and serviceable distinction, at least, can be drawn between decisions that are
plainly other-regarding and those that are "directly," "chiefly," or
"primarily" self-regarding. There will be a twilight area of cases difficult to classify, but that is true of many other workable distinctions,
including that between night and day.
14
In an earlier work I commented favorably on Mill's contention
that no one should be punished simply for being drunk but that a
policeman should be punished for being drunk on duty. In contrast
to Mill's policeman (or for that matter a drunken driver), I
considered
a hard working bachelor who habitually spends his evening hours
drinking himself into a stupor, which he then seeps off, rising fresh
in the morning to put in another hard day's work. His drinking
does not direaty affect others in any of the ways of the drunk policeman's conduct. He has no family; he drinks alone and sets no direct example; he is not prevented from discharging any of his
public duties; he creates no substantial risk of harm to the interests
of other individuals. Although even his private conduct will have
some effects on the interests of others, these are precisely the sorts of
effects Mill would call "indirect" and "remote." First, in spending
his evenings the way he does, our solitary tippler is not doing any
number of other things that might be of greater utility to others. In
not earning and spending more money, he is failing to stimulate the
economy (except for the liquor industry) as much as he might. Second, he fails to spend his evening time improving his talents and
making himself a better person. . . . Third, he may make those of
his colleagues who like him sad on his behalf. Finally, to those who
know of his habits he is a "bad example."' 15
All of these indirect effects together are insufficient to warrant our
locating the solitary tippling of the bachelor outside the boundaries
of his sovereign domain. (Note how preposterous it would be for one
nation to intervene forcibly in the internal affairs of another on the
grounds that it is not sufficiently stimulating the world economy; it
is not sufficiently improving its own culture; it makes other nations
sad on its behalf; and it sets a bad example for "emergent nations"!)
What plausible alternative is there to using the distinction between self-and-other-regarding decisions, such as it is, as a guide to
the mapping of the boundaries of personal autonomy? One alternative answer is provided by the view I call "legal paternalism," the
13 Id at 99-100.
14 Id
15 J. FEINBERG, SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY 32 (1973) (emphasis in original).
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theory that it can be morally legitimate for the state to interfere with
an individual's liberty on the sole ground that the intervention is necessary to prevent the individual from harming or risking harm to
himself, even though no third party interests are threatened by his
conduct. If we interpret legal paternalism as having no conception of
its own of personal sovereignty, then insofar as we are committed to
some intuitive notion of our own sovereign domain, we must hold
paternalism under grave suspicion. If, on the other hand, legal paternalism has its own conception of personal autonomy, its associated
domain boundaries must be defined not by a person's primarily selfregarding choices, but rather by his own true interests or real good.
C.

The Challenge of Legal Paternalism: One's Right Versus One's Good

Perhaps the fairest way of putting the presumptive case against
legal paternalism is to say that even when conjoined with other principles, it has at best a very limited conception of personal autonomy.
Even though it is consistent with the recognition of a person's right of
self-determination, it subordinates that rzht to the person's own good.
The concept of person's "own good" is analytically linked to the
concept of his personal interest, but interests may vary considerably
among persons so that there is no one conception of a personal good
that applies to everyone. Nevertheless, most philosophers have been
sympathetic to the idea of "natural interests" that grow out of our
inherited constitutions as human beings, and which can be characterized in a fashion that is sufficiently formal or abstract to accommodate individual differences. One traditional view identifies a person's
good ultimately with his self-fufillment-a notion that is certainly not
identical with that of autonomy or the right of self-determination.
Self-fulfillment is not the same as achievement and not to be confused with pleasure or contentment, though achievement is often
highly fulfilling, and fulfillment is usually highly gratifying. Other
conceptions of a person's own good identify it with achievement, or
contentment, or happiness (in the sense of predominant pleasantness
or conscious satisfaction). On all these accounts one's good is conceptually distinct from one's right of self-government.
No one would deny, however, that a person's good and the exercise of his autonomous right are closely related, at least instrumentally. If one holds that the good is self-fulfillment and, like Mill, that
development of the basic human faculties of choice and reasoned decision are components of self-fulfillment, then one must embrace the
conclusion that the right to the unhampered exercise of choice is an
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indispensable means to one's own good. 16 Moreover, if one holds, also
like Mill, that in the majority of cases an individual knows better
than any outsider what is good for him, 17 then it follows that the
policy of allowing individuals to choose whenever possible for themselves, even to choose risky courses, is the policy most likely to promote their personal fulfillments, even though in some cases
individuals may predictably exercise their autonomous choices
unwisely.
There are only four standard ways of treating the relation between personal autonomy and personal good. The first of these is
especially attractive to the paternalist, namely to derive the right of
self-determination entirely from its conducibility to a person's own
good (usually conceived as self-fulfillment). That right then is not a
soverezn right, not ultimate, basic, or "natural," but entirely derivative and instrumental. On this view we may exercise a right to selfdetermination only because, and only insofar as, it promotes our
good to do so. Nevertheless, an instrumental conception of the right
of self-government, if strong enough, will differ only in rare instances,
when applied to particular cases, from a conception of that right as
basic and sovereign. John Stuart Mill's On Liberty is an instructive
case in point. Mill insists that a given normal adult is much more
likely to know his own interests, talents, and natural dispositions (in
16

This is the famous "moral muscles argument," developed in the first eight paragraphs

of Chapter III of ON LIBERTY. In effect the argument proceeds as follows:

(i) (The explicit departure from hedonism): The highest good for man is neither
enjoyment nor passive contentment, but rather a dynamic process of growth and
self-realization, in which uniquely human faculties-perception, judgment, discriminative feeling, powerful human emotion, mental activity, and moral preference-are progressively perfected.
(ii) These powers, like the muscular powers, are improved only by being used
(exercised).
(iii) Exercise of the moral muscles requires constant choice-making, which in turn
requires freedom to make even foolish (self-regarding) choices, freedom not only
from legal coercion but also from the tyranny of custom.
(iv) Therefore, interference with free choice hampers the development of distinctive
human propensities in whose fulfillment consists a person's good.
J.S. MILL, supra note 12, at 67-76.
17 This is a quite distinct argument from the "moral muscles argument." It is found in
several places in ON LIBERTY. Sometimes the emphasis is on the actual likelihood of error
when an outsider presumes to know a person's interests better than he: "[T]he strongest of all
the arguments against the interference of the public with purely personal conduct is that,
when it does interfere, the odds are that it interferes wrongly [mistakenly] and in the wrong
place." Id at 102. In other places the emphasis is on the advantages of the individual over
others in knowing his own interest: "[W]ith respect to his own feelings and circumstances the
most ordinary man or woman has means of knowledge immeasurably surpassing these that
can be possessed by anyone else." Id at 93.
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the fulfillment of which consists his good) than is any other party,
and much more capable therefore of directing his own affairs to the
end of his good than is a government official or a legislator. The
individual's advantages in this regard seem so great that for most
practical purposes we could hold that recognition and enforcement
of the right of self-determination is a causally necessary condition for
the achievement of the individual's own good. Thus Mill argued in
On Liberty that the attempt even of a genuinely benevolent state to
impose upon an adult an external conception of his own good is almost certain to be self-defeating, and that an adult's own good is
"best provided for by allowing him to take his own means of pursu' 18
ing it."
It is logically open to Mill to argue (as he sometimes seems ready
to) that the relation between a person's right of self-determination
and his good of self-fulfillment is not merely a strong instrumental
connection but an invariant correspondence. On this second view,
whatever harm a person might do to "his own good" by the foolish
exercise of his free choice would in every case necessarily be outweighed by the greater harm done by interference and the substitution of outside direction. This is the position that would enable Mill
to maintain his utilitarian commitment to the reduction of harms
and his exceptionless opposition to paternalism both, so it must have
had some appeal to him. Moreover, he has shown impressively that
there is always and necessarily a cost to a person whenever outside
judgment is forcibly substituted for his own choice, and that in an
overwhelming preponderance of cases the intervention will be selfdefeating, but he has not and could not show that necessarily in evet,
case the cost will be greater than the harm prevented and that the
intervention will defeat its own purpose. For the most part, therefore, Mill seems prepared to acknowledge that the correspondence
between self-direction and self-fulfillment is contingent and subject
to infrequent exceptions (the first view). In those rare cases where we
can know that free exercise of a person's autonomy will be against his
own interest, as for example when he freely negotiates his own slavery in exchange for some other good, there, Mill concedes, we are
justified in interfering with his liberty in order to protect him from
extreme harm. At that point, Mill is finally ready to admit paternalistic reasons into his (otherwise) liberal scheme of justification.
A third standard interpretation of the right of self-determination
holds that it is entirely underivative, as morally basic as the good of
18 J.S. MILL, supra note 12, at 125.
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self-fulfillment itself. There is no necessity, on this view, that free
exercise of a person's autonomy will promote his own good, and even
where self-determination is likely, on objective evidence, to lead to
the person's own harm, others do not have a right to intervene coercively "for his own good." By and large, a person will be better able
to achieve his own good by making his own decisions, but even where
the opposite is true, others may not intervene, for autonomy is even
more important a thing than personal well-being. The life that a
person threatens by his own rashness is after all his life; it belongs to
him and to no one else. For that reason alone, he must be the one to
decide-for better or worse-what is to be done with it in that private realm where the interests of others are not directly involved. 19
This is the interpretation that follows from a pure conception of individual sovereign autonomy, and anyone who holds such a conception, tacitly or explicitly, can find no appeal in-indeed is logically
precluded from holding-legal paternalism.
A fourth way of regarding the adult's right of autonomy proposes a compromise. It thinks of autonomy as neither derivative
from nor more basic than its possessor's own good (self-fulfillment),
but rather as coordinate with it. In the more plausible versions of
this view, 20 a person's own good in the vast majority of cases will be
most reliably furthered if he is allowed to make his own choices in
self-regarding matters, but where that coincidence of values does not
hold, one must simply do one's best to balance autonomy against
personal well-being, and decide between them intuitively, since
neither has automatic priority over the other. This compromise, of
course, will not satisfy the liberal adherent of personal sovereignty
since it restricts individual authority to some degree even in the
wholly self-regarding domain; but it is consistent with a kind of legal
paternalism, for its proponent can concede that paternalistic considerations, where they apply, are always relevant as reasons of some
weight, even when they conflict with reasons of other kinds and may
not be decisive. This modestly paternalistic theory allows room for
personal autonomy but does not conceive of it on the model of territorial sovereignty, since it permits it to be balanced against other
considerations, and thereby deprives it of its trumping effect.
I cannot conceal my own preference, at least initially, for posi19 This third interpretation of autonomy rights is defended in my essay Legal Paternalism,
1 CANADIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY 105-24 (1971), and also in my Freedom and Behavior
Control, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BIOETHICS 93-100 (W.T. Reich ed. 1978).
20 See, e.g., J. GLOVER, CAUSING DEATH AND SAVING LIVES 74-85 (1977); J. KLEINIG,
PATERNALISM (1984 forthcoming).
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tion (iii). As the only view consistent with a conception of personal
sovereignty, it accords uniquely with a self-conception deeply imbedded in the moral attitudes of most people and apparently presupposed in many of our moral idioms, especially when used selfdefensively ("my life to live as I please," "no one else's business,"
etc.). In those rare cases where the exercise of a person's sovereign
right and what is truly good for him conflict, (iii) defends the choice
nevertheless. If that seems an absurd result, the reader should put
himself in the position of the person interfered with. Presumably, if
he genuinely chose the alternative that is in fact bad for him, he did
not choose it because he believed it was bad for him. That would be
so irrational that it would put the voluntariness of his choice in
doubt. If he chose that alternative because he believed it good (or at
least not bad) for him, then either the difference between him and his
would-be-constrainers is over some matter of fact about which he is
simply mistaken, in which case he would welcome being set right, or
it is about the nature of his self-interest, or the reasonableness, given
his values, of the risks he wishes to assume. In that case, the disagreement would be more intractable, and the reader would not welcome
the overruling of his own judgment, or the substitution of the "better
values" of others for his own.
There is still another possibility. The person may have chosen
to act as he did believing the consequences would be bad for his selfinterest, but to act despite that expectation, not because of it. Perhaps
he wishes to sacrifice "his own good," or some part of it, for the sake
of others, or for some treasured cause; or perhaps he deliberately values short term good over his future good through the long run. Identifying with the person in one of those cases, can the reader genuinely
prefer "repression for his own good" over facilitation of his own fully
informed choice? If not, how then can he have a different preference
for others? Even in the cases where the person subsequently regrets
his choice, he may not regret that he had not been forcibly prevented
from making it. There must be a right to err, to be mistaken, to
decide foolishly, to take big risks, if there is to be any meaningful selfrule; without it, the whole idea of dejure autonomy begins to unravel.
D. Autonomy Contrasted With Liberty and De Facto Freedom
A particularly perplexing form of the conflict between one's sovereign right and one's own good is that which arises when a person
exercises his sovereignty to alienate some of his own liberty at some
future time. Does one's future liberty lie beyond the boundaries of
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one's sovereignty so that others may interfere with present choices for
its protection? Discussions of this question from Mill to the present
have been marred by a failure to distinguish with consistent clarity
between dejure autonomy (or sovereignty) and defacto freedom. For
that reason, we shall linger over that conceptual distinction before
applying it to the substantive question about domain boundaries.
The extent of our defacto freedom of action is determined not by
any characteristics or powers of ourselves. Rather it is entirely a
function of the circumstances in which we find ourselves. Insofar as
those circumstances contain open options, just to that extent do we
have freedom of action. A person has an "open option" in respect to
some possible action, x, when nothing in his objective circumstances
prevents him from doing x if he should choose, and nothing in his
objective circumstances requires him to do x if he should choose not
to. What he wants to do, what he actually chooses to do, what he
believes his options to be, how aware he is of his surrounding circumstances, are all quite irrelevant to the question of what options he
actually has, just as they are irrelevant to the question of what the
temperature of the surrounding air is. What options are open to him
is entirely a function of the existence and location of external barriers
and obstacles. (And if it is specifically political freedom we are talking about, that is wholly a matter of the existence and location of
specifically political or legal barriers.) Freedom of action then is understood the way the "unsophisticated person" in Schopenhauer's account understands it: "I can do what I will: if I will to go to the left,
I go to the left; if I will to go to the right, I go to the right. This
'2
depends entirely on my will; therefore, I am free." '
Schopenhauer, however, quickly raises another question: I can
(sometimes) do what I will, but when if ever am I free to will otherwise? What does it mean to be free of interference to choose as I wish?
The alcoholic, for example, may have an intense desire to choose not
to have another drink, but when his host returns with the bottle, he
finds himself, to his despair, choosing contrary to his own wishes.
Such a person may have freedom of action (for whatever that is
worth), including political liberty (the law neither required nor prohibited another drink), but he lacked freedom of choice. 22 He was
free to act as he chose, but not free to choose as he wished. He suf21 A. SCHOPENHAUER, ESSAY ON THE FREEDOM OF THE WILL 19 (K. Kolenda trans.
1960).
22 For an ingenious elaboration of this "second level" account of freedom to will, see
Harry G. Frankfurt, Freedom of the Willandthe Concept ofa Person, 68 THEJOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY 5-20 (1971).
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fered from no lack of opportunity to abstain, but he succumbed anyway, because of impaired psychological capacities.23 His option to
choose was closed even though his option to act was open. It is as if
there were a network of railroad tracks within each person's psyche
with switches open to some possible choices and locked closed to
others. Our freedom of choice on balance is a function of the
number and fecundity of such options left open, including those options we would never wish to exercise.
So construed, freedom is an important good in human life.
Most people have a welfare interest in maintaining an essential minimum of freedom, and a security interest in having more open options
still. Some people even have a kind of "accumulative interest" in
enjoying as much freedom as possible, well beyond necessity or security. Minimal liberty is an essential good for most of us, much like
economic sufficiency or health. Greater amounts of freedom are for
many of us goods to be treasured like art objects, natural beauty,
adventure, achievement, power, or love. But it is very important to
recognize that freedom is one kind of good among many, that people
have been known to get along well with very little of it, that rational
persons are often willing to "trade" large amounts of it for goods of
other kinds, including simple contentment, that philosophers have
proclaimed the "dreadfulness" of the burden of too much of it, and
that sometimes the "price" of an increment of freedom, as measured
in other goods, is a bad bargain. The dejure autonomous person will
surely reserve the right to "trade-off" his defacto freedoms for goods of
other kinds, as measured on his own scale of values and determined
by his own judgment.
There is no paradox then when a morally autonomous person
exercises his sovereign right of self-government to diminish his own de
facto freedom of action. Provided only that his consent be free and
informed, he might even submit to manipulative treatments designed
to close some of his options to choose. It will be instructive to examine
how those treatments, often called "behavior control," sometimes
are, and sometimes are not, consistent with dejure autonomy. These
manipulative techniques can be employed either to close or to open a
23 Impaired psychological capacities are not the only cause of closed choice-options.
When persons undertake moral commitments they may be "morally bound" not to choose in
the way they would (otherwise) prefer to. A person with powerful scruples may find that he
"cannot bring himself" to act in the way he intensely wants to act. It is not plausible to treat
integrity as "an impaired psychological capacity," but the honorable person, nevertheless, has
fewer open choice-options than the dishonorable person. One can, therefore, have too much
of a good thing called "free will."
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person's options to choose either with or without his consent. Each of
the four combinations has its own effect on freedom, and its own
24
reflection on dejure autonomy.
Where manipulative techniques are used to open a person's options with his voluntary consent, there is an enlargement of freedom
and no violation of autonomy; hence, this is the least troublesome
category. A harder case is that in which a person consents to behavior control which closes some options irrevocably for the sake of a
good he has come to value more than his freedom. Respect for autonomy requires noninterference with such choices provided they are
genuinely voluntary and fully informed. On the other hand, manipulation of a person without his consent in order to close his options
restricts freedom and violates autonomy too. This third category is
the most obviously impermissible kind of case. The most troublesome and controversial kind of case, in contrast, is that in which a
person is manipulated without his consent for the benign purpose of
enlarging his future freedom of choice, but even here, the doctrine of
personal sovereignty requires that a person's moral right to govern
himself within his sovereign domain be given precedence even over
his future defacto freedom.
E. Autonomous Forfeitures of Liberty and Autonomy Itself
Given the contrast between defacto freedom and dejure autonomy (personal sovereignty), there is no conceptual incoherence in the
idea of an autonomous forfeiture either of the good of freedom or the
right of self-government itself. Not only can such forfeitures occur;
they are beyond the legitimate powers of others to prevent, provided
that they are voluntary, and that personal sovereignty covers a domain whose boundaries are drawn in accordance with self-and-otherregarding criterion. If we assume with John Stuart Mill (excluding
his occasional lapses) and the grand liberal tradition that the domain
of the sovereign individual consists of all his activities that do not
seriously impinge on the important interests of other people, than we
can say that respectfor a person's autonomy is respectfor his unfettered voluntary choice as the sole rightfuildeterminantofhis actions except where the interests of others needprotectionfrom him. Whenever a person is compelled
to act or to omit acting on the grounds that he must be protected
from bad judgment in the ordering of his own goods and values even
though no other people are endangered, then his autonomy is in24 The following paragraph draws on my article Freedom and Behavior Control, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BiOETHiCS 93 (W.T. Reich ed. 1978).
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fringed. From the moral point of view, this is just as if one sovereign
state invaded the air space or off-shore fishing waters of another, or
sent armies to occupy a part of its land, or otherwise violated its sovereignty. Whether interference with an autonomous person's liberty
is done in the name of his own good or welfare, his health, his wealth,
or even hisfuture open options-which are themselves constituents of his
well-being-it is still a violation of his personal sovereignty. After all,
sovereign political states do not claim the right to impose their benevolent interventions on other sovereign states; how then can autonomous individuals coerce other autonomous individuals into conduct
deemed conducive to their own long-range good?
The point applies just as much to coercion of another designed
to increase his defacto freedom (open options) as it does to compulsions and prohibitions aimed at promoting any other element of a
person's well-being. It is of course the right and the duty of a parent
forcibly to prevent a small child from harming his own future interests, even without the child's consent. It is a duty of parents to keep
as many as possible of a child's central life-options open until the
child becomes an autonomous adult himself, and can decide on his
own how to exercise them.2 5 But it is paternalism in an objectionable
sense forcibly to prevent an autonomous adult from voluntarily trading some of his own "open options" for preferred benefits of another
kind. A rational adult could have very good reasons for giving away
all of his worldly goods, or even terminating his own life, or in the
most extreme hypothetical case, even for selling himself into slavery,
and thus perhaps irrevocably closing his most fecund options. And
even if we do not think much of his reasons, we may have to concede
that he is making a perfectly genuine voluntary choice of his own,
albeit an unreasonable one by our standards. Such a choice might
seem unreasonable to us; it might be one that we could never make.
But it need not be an insane or nonresponsible choice. In some cases
we might better think of it as saintly, heroic, courageous, adventurous, romantic, or just plain odd. In any case, if the chooser is an
autonomous adult deciding voluntarily, the choice must be his to
make and not ours, and the responsibility too is his to take. That is
what follows from our description of him as an autonomous person
with sovereign control over his own domain. A perfectly autonomous
person would have, in Mill's words, the "power ofvoluntarily disposingof
25 See my essay The Child's Right to an Open Future, in WHOSE CHILD? CHILDREN'S
RIGHTS, PARENTAL AUTHORITY, AND STATE POWER 124-53 (W. Aiken & H. LaFollette eds.

1980).
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his own lot in life, ' 2 6 even if that involved forfeiture of his defacto
freedom in the future.
The point applies equally to voluntary refusals to increase one's
own freedom. If we hold fast to our distinction between one's balance of defacto freedom construed in terms of the number and fecundity of the options actually open to a person, on the one hand, and
personal autonomy interpreted as the sovereign right to decide
within one's own proper domain, on the other, we can make sense
out of Rousseau's infamous phrase "forced to be free" (though probably not the sense Rousseau intended).2 7 But though that notion be
intelligible and coherent, no advocate of personal sovereignty can
rest content with efforts to justify invasions of autonomy by citing the
increase in defacto freedom thereby brought about. It i' possible to
have the area of one's freedom to act enlarged by force, and when
this happens, some of one's options are closed by a violent or coercive
act that at the same time causes many more options, or options of
greater fecundity, to open. Thus a person might be dragged struggling and kicking over the border from a cruel police state into a
liberal democracy. He may have resisted out of mere habit, or family
loyalty, or because he genuinely preferred tyranny to freedqm. Not
everyone appreciates having open options and the difficult burden of
having always to choose for oneself what one shall do. But whatever
a person's motives for resisting the expansion of his options, the condition so described is one of greater freedom of action. It is important to note, however-and this has been my primary thesis thus
far-that benign as our motives might be, insofar as we force a person against his will into a condition he did not choose, we undermine
his status as a person in rightful control of his own life. We may be
right when we tell him that greater freedom of action is for his own
good in the long run, but we nevertheless violate his autonomy if we
force our better conception of his own good upon him.
Does a person act within the proper boundaries of his personal
sovereignty when he voluntarily forfeits dejure autonomy itself?. As
we have seen, there is neither conceptual nor (necessarily) moral difficulty when a political state renounces some part of its sovereignty.
Imperial powers forfeit their right to rule over colonies, and federal
states grant full independence to locally autonomous regions. It is
26 J.S. MILL, spra note 12, at 125 (emphasis added).
27 JEAN JACQUES RoussEAu, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 16-18 (8th ed. 1960). See also the
criticism in Isaiah Berlin's Two Concepts of Libero, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 131-34, 14748 (1969).
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very difficult to think of an analogous way in which a person could
renounce "a part" of his sovereignty unless we think perhaps of a
master relinquishing his claim to "rule" over a slave through an act
of manumission, or in a more far-fetched example still, an organdonor forfeiting his "sovereignty over" a kidney, or another "regionally autonomous part." It is easier to think of individuals renouncing
total sovereignty, and simply "going out of business" as independent
persons, much as a state might decide through some legitimate parliamentary body to dissolve itself.
Consider then the hypothetical example of a sovereign national
state voluntarily relinquishing its own autonomy. If the Canadian
Parliament, following its own constitutional rules, voted unanimously to accept an American invitation to become the fifty-first
state, but was then prevented from doing so by threats of military
intervention by the Soviet Union, boycott by the British Commonwealth, and condemnation by the United Nations, Canada might
well claim that its autonomy had been violated by the coercion that
prevented implementation of its own sovereign will. It might charge
that coercion had prevented it from "voluntarily disposing of its own
lot in the future," no less an infringement of present sovereignty for
being a protection of future independence. Such a claim, I think,
would be both coherent, and in this political case at least, well
founded.
What this example shows is that the idea of sovereign renunciation of sovereignty is a coherent one in the political arena where the
concept of sovereignty has its original home. It is neither unstable,
contradictory, nor paradoxical. If we transfer the whole concept of
sovereignty from the nation to the person, then we should expect the
same implications for the personal forfeitures of autonomy. Of
course, it is open to one to deny that the idea of sovereignty applies to
persons in the first place, but if one is friendly to that notion, one
must face up to its implications.
II.

Privacy as Autonomy

A. Is Autonomy Alienable? The Riddle of "Voluntarg Slavey"
What would a total and irrevocable forfeiture of freedom or autonomy look like? The example that has most frequently come to the
minds of philosophers is a rather extreme form of the institution of
chattel slavery in which slave-holders "own" their slaves in something like the same way they own tables and chairs, cows and horses.
The owners have exclusive and permanent proprietary rights over
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the slaves, who in turn have no enforcible rights against their masters.2 8 The point of the practice is to provide inexpensive labor for

the owner; the slave has the dubious advantage of assured (but not
contracted) sustenance and the "security" of life tenure. The latter
advantages have almost always been insufficient to induce people to
become slaves voluntarily. Rather slaves are captured in war, or forcibly abducted, or treacherously lured from their prior condition of
freedom, and kept in their servitude by stern and, if necessary, violent measures. If nevertheless, untypically, two persons signed an
agreement whereby one would become the permanent slave of the
other, that compact, as Mill reminds us, "In this and most other civilized countries.

. .

would be null and void, neither enforced by law

nor by opinion. ' 29 The question raised by this bizarre example is on
what grounds this universal nullification rests. If the only reasons
that seem always available are those provided by legal paternalism,
then the liberal must either allow, at least in this one extreme case,
that paternalistic reasons may be morally valid grounds for legal policies, or else he must deny that the firm policy against "voluntary
slavery" is morally well-founded.
There is, of course, a strange artificiality in the example. In the
first place, it is not an example of a direct criminal prohibition. Entering into a slavery contract is not in this and other civilized countries the name of a crime. The state simply refuses to offer, as a kind
of service, a mechanism for creating legal obligations of the appropriate kind, just as it refuses to provide the legal mechanism for producing homosexual or bigamous marriages. Homosexual couples and
bigamous trios might complain that their liber is infringed thereby,
but such a complaint would not be convincing. A legal disability
consequent on the state's failure to produce a service (or confer a
"legal power") is not the same as a legal duty to desist enforced by
the threat of punishment for disobedience. How can one "disobey"
the nonpossession of a legal power? Furthermore, as John Hodson
points out, "the law's refusal to enforce slavery contracts does not
prevent anyone from living in defacto slavery," 30 just as, I might add,
the law's failure to provide legal devices that enable two people of
the same sex, or two people of one sex and one of the other, to be
legal spouses, does not prevent people in these combinations from
28 Hardly any actual instances of slavery, at least in historical times, have been quite this
extreme, but this description will serve well as an hypothetical example-all the better for
being so extreme.
29 J.S. MILL, supra note 12, at 125.
30 Hodson, Mill,Paternalism, and Slavery, ANALYSIS 61 (1981).
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cohabiting on intimate terms. If the parties to these defacto arrangements wish, in addition, to bind themselves morally to one another,
there is no force to stop them.
The law's refusal to recognize slavery contracts does have indirect consequences, however, for the criminal law. If a third party
"liberates" the slave by abducting him, that would be a crime
against the slaveholder's property analogous to theft. Moreover, if
the owner has the slave's legally effective consent, in advance, to anything he might do-a kind of irrevocable blank check, so to speakthen the owner has a legal privilege to mistreat the slave in ways that
would otherwise be crimes. By not recognizing the slavery contract
as valid, the law thereby undermines the slaveholder's defense to
charges of false imprisonment (if he should lock the slave in his
quarters), assault and battery (if he should use corporal punishment
on the slave), or murder (if he should destroy his "property"). On
the other hand, if the slavery arrangements were merely defacto, then
there would be legally enforcible limits on what the owner could do
to the slave with or without the slave's prior blanket consent. That
would constitute a limit on the slave-holder's liberty, but not an additional restriction, so he has not been deprived of a liberty he formerly
had.
Would the refusal of legal recognition of the contract interfere
with the slave-s liberty? Hodson says no, on the ground that the slave
may still subject himself to the will of his master "in all the ways
associated with slavery; he may act only on the command or with the
permission of another and his life may be devoted to doing the bidding of this other person," 31 even though the arrangement is only de
facto. Only those actions of the master that are crimes are actions the
slave is not free to submit to (in the sense that the master is not at
liberty to perform them). But then the master would have no reason
to punish, incarcerate, or destroy the other person if the other is his
wholly willing slave in any case. The only point in ever doing these
things would be to exercise sheer wanton cruelty-sadism, if you will,
so it would seem that in failing to recognize the slavery contract, the
state restricts only the sado-masochistic options of the would-be slave.
But these were options closed to the person before he even entered de
facto slavery, so the state has not deprived him of liberties he once
had. The only new liberty contractual slavery would confer on him
would be the liberty to be locked up, beaten or killed, pointlessly and
wantonly, when or if his master so chooses. His own "choice" in ad31

Id. at 62.
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vance to submit to those kinds of treatment would be of suspect voluntariness, unless of course he "genuinely loved Big Brother" and
wanted nothing more than faithful prostration before his omnipotent
will.
Mill took the problem to be one of protecting the would-be
slave, rather than the would-be owner, from the consequences of his
own voluntary agreements, and insofar as his solution would justify a
legal policy (of non-validation) on those terms, it is paternalistic in
spirit. Let us focus on the possible motives of this hypothetical odd
duck, the voluntary would-be slave. Why would anyone in his right
mind ever want to enter into such a relationship with another? (Insofar as someone is not in his right mind, just so far does his agreement fall short of the voluntariness required for valid consent, in
which case the state can refuse to enforce it without infringing his
autonomy.) Possible motivations can be divided into two categories.
Either the would-be slave finds the prospect of slavery intrinsically
appealing or he is willing to endure it for the sake of other benefits to
be conferred by the owner as contractual "consideration." If the former, he may have a powerful psychological need of atonement for
some sin, or for the achievement of perfect self-discipline through a
kind of self-abasement, or he may feel a philosophical imperative to
lose his sense of self-centeredness altogether through devoted service
and unconditional commitment to another, or a religious need to
achieve genuine humility through the lowliest status he can acquire.
Some of these motives will be of doubtful genuineness, and should no
doubt be checked carefully for voluntariness before the contract is
validated, but it would be dogmatic to insist that necessarily and in
each case, all motives in this category must fail the test of voluntariness. Voluntary self-enslavement for some of these reasons seems no
crazier than the solitary forms of holy asceticism, like choosing the
life of an anchorite in the desert, wearing sackcloth and ashes, and
mortifying the flesh.
If the would-be slave's motives fall into this first category, then
there is hardly any reason why he needs a legal contract from a willing would-be owner. If he wants de facto slavery there is no legal
barrier to his goal. If he wishes irrevocability, he is free to make his
own binding commitment both to himself and to the other, just as
unmarried lovers might vow lifelong unmarried fidelity to one another without benefit of legal enforcement. So, with the exception of
the protection against otherwise criminal mistreatment which would
be waived in a legally recognized slavery contract of the extreme
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kind, there is really no point or need, from the point of view of the
would-be slave, in having such a contract. And there are additional
reasons which he might or might not share with the state, for not
having such a contract. In the unlikely future event that the slave
changes his mind and wants to leave the arrangement, then in the
absence of an irrevocable contract, he may do so, and that would be
to his advantage. If, in the more likely event that he never changes
his mind (and the master remains willing) he may continue in the
arrangement without benefit of contract. At the most he would need
a contract to protect him from the master's change of mind, but if his
motive is instant and total obeisance to his master's will in all things,
it would not be likely that he would wish to impose himself on the
master against the master's will.
What protection would a legal contract offer the slave-holder,
still assuming the slave's motives are of the first category, and no
additional consideration has been contributed by the master? In the
first place, it would be a very odd contract indeed if it enforced only
promises from the slave to the owner and imposed no reciprocal obligation on the owner. But even assuming the legal coherence of such
a supposition, the legal guarantees enforced by the state would be
utterly otiose, for by hypothesis, the owner has made no investment
in the arrangement to be "protected." He has contributed no quidpro
quo and made no reciprocal promises. Enforcing a promise to him
when he has made none in return-and an irrevocable promise at
that-would not be to "protect" him, so much as to dump a huge
gratuitous advantage on him. One does not have to be a legal paternalist to find reasons against such an absurd policy, especially when
the alternative does not, in any usual sense, infringe anyone's liberty.
The more plausible category of possible motives of the would-be
slave is the second one. He is willing to take his chances with inescapable servitude to this particular master, not because of its intrinsic
appeal, or his philosophical or religious imperatives, but because of
some offer the would-be owner makes him as an inducement. If we are
still speaking of the most extreme form of chattel-slavery, in which
the slave loses all his rights, then the consideration presumably is to
be paid in advance while the would-be slave is still a free negotiator.
If it were a promise of future wages or minimal working conditions,
on the other hand, then once the slave had lost his rights, the promise
could be broken with impunity. Very likely the consideration would
be paid in advance to a third-party, who would maintain his own
right to the benefit after the would-be slave had become an actual
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slave, and lost all his own rights. We can imagine any number of
intelligible (though not attractive) motives in this category for entering irrevocable rightless slavery. A person might agree to become a
slave in exchange for ten million dollars to be delivered in advance to
a loved one or to a worthy cause, or in payment for the prior enjoyment of some supreme benefit, as in the Faust legend. (It is more
difficult, but not impossible to imagine corresponding motives of the
purchaser.) We are imagining now a would-be slave who is no pathological masochist, not neurotic, not obsessed with guilt, not even
eccentric in his values, but rather (say) a genuinely benevolent person who wants to provide for a sickly widow's children, or do what he
takes to be the maximal good with his life by contributing an immense sum to medical research, or to a favored political cause. He
has no independent desire for self-sacrifice, but he is willing to assume a dangerous risk of future damage to his self-interest for the
sake of the contribution he can make now. Is that example, in its
bare description, any stranger than risking one's life and limb to race
motorcycles or climb mountains?
When payment has been made in advance, the purchaser can
then in theory be protected by a legal contract. Otherwise, if his
slave runs away, he has lost his ten million and the slave too. Enforcement in this case would, therefore, have the point (its sole point,
I think) of protecting the owner at the expense of his slave in that
special contingency where the slave has a change of mind. But it
takes little imagination to think of countervailing reasons for nonenforcement. What would enforcement consist in? Forcible return of
the escapee in irons; civil suits against all who may have assisted him;
organized manhunts, either by private parties with legal permission
and cooperation, or by the police; prosecution of diverse third parties
for such crimes against property as incitement to escape, aiding and
abetting escape, withholding information about escapees, and so on.
Such activities would be a demoralizing public spectacle, analogous
to tolerating the starvation on the public streets of poor wretches who
had gambled unwisely with their lives in other ways. And they
would trample grossly on the interests of many third parties. These
are but some of the many possible nonpaternalistic reasons for the
refusal to recognize slavery contracts.
What were Mill's reasons for the refusal to validate slavery
agreements? Virtually his entire argument is expressed, with admirable succinctness, in the following oft-quoted passage:
The ground for thus limiting his [i.e. the would-be slave's] power of
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voluntarily disposing of his own lot in life is apparent, and is very
clearly seen in this extreme case. The reason [in general] for not
interfering, unless for the sake of others, with a person's voluntary
acts is consideration for his liberty. His voluntary choice is evidence that what he so chooses is desirable, or at least endurable, to
him, and his good is on the whole best provided for by allowing him
to take his own means of pursuing it. But by selling himself for a
slave, he abdicates his liberty; he foregoes any future use of it beyond that single act. He therefore defeats, in his own case, the very
purpose which is the justification of allowing him to dispose of himself. He is no longer free, but is thenceforth in a position which has
no longer the presumption in its favor that would be afforded by his
voluntarily remaining in it. The principle 32of freedom cannot require that he should be free not to be free.
The first and most natural interpretation of this argument is as
an appeal not to a sovereign n'ght to "dispose of one's own lot in life"
but to a person's own good in the long run, or more precisely to one
element of his good, his overall freedom. On this interpretation Mill
is faithful to his own promise in Chapter I to forego appeal to natural
rights and restrict his arguments to utilitarian considerations. 33 The
appeal in this case is to each individuals own good and not necessarily
to the public good (social utility), but it is at least consistent with an
overarching utilitarian scheme of justification, as appeal to an underivative sovereign right would not be. Defacto freedom, on this interpretation, is one good or benefit-indeed, a supremely important
one-among many, and its loss, one evil-indeed, an extremely serious one-among many types of harm. The aim of the law being to
maximize beneficial goods and (especially) to prevent harms of all
kinds and from all sources, the law must take a negative attitude, in
general, toward forfeitures of, as well as interferences with, freedom.
Still, by and large, and in all but the most extreme cases, Mill is
saying, legal paternalism is an unacceptable policy because in attempting to impose upon a person an external conception of his own
good, it is very likely to be self-defeating. The key to this interpretation is Mill's language in this crucial passage: "His voluntary choice
is evidence that what he so chooses is desirable, or at least endurable to
him, and his good is on the whole best provided for by allowing him to
32 J.S. MILL, supra note 12, at 125. The remainder of this paragraph is devoted to the
problem of irrevocable contracts in general, and argues that "there are perhaps no contracts
. . . except those that relate to money" that should preclude possibility of retraction. He
explicitly advocates no-fault divorce (as it has since come to be called) in this passage.
33 Id at 14: "I forego any advantage which could be derived to my argument from the
idea of abstract right as a thing independent of utility."
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'34
take his own means of pursuing it."
"Evidence" is not necessity,

and "on the whole" means "in most but not all possible cases." Contrast this cautious instrumental approach with Mill's more absolutistic language in other places where he decrees that protection of
others is "the sole end" warranting legal coercion, and its "only rightful purpose," and that in self-regarding matters, the individual's "independence is of right, absolute," and over himself "the individual is
sovereign. '3 5 If he had consistently followed the approach suggested
by the absolutistic language, Mill's opposition to hard paternalism
would have conceded no exceptions. If he had committed himself to
(instead of merely flirting with) the principle of unqualified respect
for a person's voluntary choice as such, even when it is the choice of a
loss of freedom, he could have remained adamantly opposed to paternalism even in the most extreme cases of self-harm, for he would
then be committed to the view that there is something more important (even) than the avoidance of harm. The principle that shuts and
locks the door leading to legal paternalism is that every person has a
human right to "voluntarily dispose of his own lot in life" whatever
the effect on his own net balance of benefits (including "freedom")
and harms.
One interpretation of the quoted passage takes it to be a simple
aberration from the main drift of Mill's argument in On Liberty
which, as is indicated in Mill's frequent use of political metaphors
like "sovereign," "dominion," "reign supreme," and so on, is profoundly respectful of dejure autonomy. There are other places in the
same chapter where Mill reveals his familiarity with, and firm grasp
of, the distinction between de jure autonomy and de facto freedom,
although he nowhere used the word "autonomy." Richard Arneson
calls our attention to Mill's discussion of Mormon polygamy, 36 where
he expresses a surprisingly permissive attitude. Arneson points out
that
Mill characterizes polygamous marriages as "a riveting of the
chains of one half of the community." Much like a benighted person who voluntarily contracts himself into slavery, except on a
smaller scale, the Mormon wife relinquishes her freedom over the
long run. Mill explicitly traces his "disapprobation" of Mormon
polygamy to his understanding that this institution constitutes a
"direct infraction" of the principle of liberty. But while a Mormon
wife does not live freely, she does live autonomously, if she is living
34
35
36

Id at 125 (emphasis added).
Id at 13.
Id at 111.
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out afate she has chosenfor herselfwithout compulsion or coercion. Of Mor-

mon marriage, Mill says, "It must be remembered that this relation
is as much voluntary on the part of the women concerned in it, and
who may be deemed the sufferers by it, as is the case with any other
form of the marriage institution." Mill's hesitation in this quotation must stem from a doubt as to how voluntary can be any per-son's choice to marry when the only alternatives
society tolerates
37
are one form of marriage or spinsterhood.
My only quibble with Arneson in this passage is over the phrase "live
autonomously." In some hypothetical examples (whether true of polygamy or not) one can autonomously choose a life in which all
further dejure autonomy is forfeited. It would be misleading to describe the career consequent upon that choice as one of "living autonomously," but it would be an autonomously chosen life in any
case, and to interfere with its choice would be to infringe the
chooser's autonomy at the time he makes the choice, that is to treat
him in a manner precluded by respect for him as an autonomous
agent. I suspect that Arneson would agree.
If one's very autonomy can be alienated, is there nothing then
that an autonomous agent may not alienate? The answer to this
question, I think, is that even an autonomous person cannot effectivel', alienate certain duties, and the responsibility for what he does.
Suppose that A, the slave-holder, commands B, his voluntary slave,
to murder C, an innocent third party. To obey the command, B
would have to violate his own duty to C (not to kill him), which is
logically correlated with C's right against him (not to be killed). For
B to alienate that duty would be for him to alienate one of C's rights,
which is absurd. Even an autonomous being cannot give up what
was not his in the first place. If after the murder, B pleads in his own
defense that he was a mere instrument in A's hands with no will of
his own, and that "instruments don't kill people, only people kill people," the excuse is unacceptable for the same reason that obedience
to a higher authority cannot excuse atrocities. No man can make
himself into a mere instrument of another's will. Even an autonomous agent cannot alienate his ultimate accountability.
B.

Less Extreme Forms of Irrevocable Commitment: Deciding For One's
Future Self

Slavery contracts are theoretically interesting constructs with
which to test theories, but otherwise of very little practical interest.
37 Ameson, Mill versus Paternalism, 90 ETHIcs 470, 476 (1980) (emphasis added).
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There are more familiar examples, however, of irrevocable commitments that purport to bind one's own future self as well as other parties. These purported commitments are irrevocable, but unlike
slavery, they are neither total nor necessarily permanent, since the
committed performances or forebearances are often dated for a specific future time. They can result from contractual agreements, as
when the seller of a business agrees not to open a competing business
in the same city with the buyer, or from extracted promises, as when
A gets B to promise to enforce A's current resolution, if necessary,
against A's own future self.
These cases provide important tests for a theory of autonomy,
since they show how an adequate conception of personal sovereignty
must not only mark the "spatial" and topical boundaries of the personal domain, but must also provide for the shifting "temporal
boundaries" as well. Individuals often knowingly exercise their autonomy at a particular time in a way intended to diminish their freedom at some future time, and sometimes when that future time
comes, the same sovereign self has second thoughts and demands his
freedom back. In some cases the earlier forfeitures were understood
all along to be tentative and revocable, but in other cases the earlier
self had either bound himself contractually not to revoke, or else issued explicit instructions to an agreeable party to disregard any contrary instructions from one's future self. Does my sovereignty at the
present time reign over my future selves? Can I cancel now their
right to a change of mind? Or is their freedom in this respect the one
thing I cannot be free to alienate, as Mill claimed?
We can make a start toward separating the easy from the difficult cases by asking which request, that of the early self to bind the
later, or that of the later self for a release, is closer to being a genuinely voluntary one, or one that reflects the settled disposition of the
chooser as an enduring self over time. The problem will be relatively
easy when either the future self's choice or the later's is substantially
less than voluntary. There are various homey examples of later
choices that are defective in this way. Suppose, for example, that I
ask a friend to wake me at five in the morning and urge him to pay
no heed to my future self's protests at that hour. When five o'clock
comes along, and wakened from a sound sleep I announce a change
of mind, the friend is entitled to give greater weight to the clearheaded, deliberate resolution of the earlier self, than to the incoherent, sleepy mumblings of the later one. Similarly, if I have a drinking problem, and I urge my host not to pour me more than two
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drinks at next week's party "no matter what I say at the time," and
he promises to do so at my request, then when my compulsive, excited, abandoned future self renounces my earlier request, the party
host should think of the earlier request as the controlling one.
Similarly, a second party can sometimes confidently support the
earlier self when its will conflicts with that of the later self, on the
grounds that the later self's contrary "choice" is the result of coercion
or fraud, and hence is not wholly voluntary. Those reasons were certainly the ground of the decision of Odysseus' sailors not to unbind
him, despite his urgent requests, when he was under the influence of
the Sirens. 38 Odysseus was warned by Circe, before his ship departed
from her island, that he is headed on a dangerous course, first of all
to the place of the Sirens, whose beautiful singing literally enchants
all those who hear it, and leads them to their deaths. Following
Circe's advice, Odysseus has his sailors plug their ears so that they
won't be enchanted, but he himself wants to hear the beautiful music
without being trapped, so Circe directs him to have his sailors bind
him to the mast, and order them not to release him until safely out of
harm's-way, even if he should command them to do so. Under the
alluring influence of the Sirens, Odysseus does "change his mind,"
but his sailors wisely keep the promise they made to his earlier self,
rightly inferring that the earlier self was the real Odysseus.
On the other hand, there are occasions on which one might
judge retrospectively that the instructions of the earlier self were less
voluntary than the contrary preferences of the later self. Perhaps the
earlier self had been "beside himself" with rage or some other judgment-clouding emotion, whereas his later self is calm and convincingly reasonable. Or an earlier self, in a deep but temporary
depression induced by a shocking event, or perhaps even by a drug,
extracts a .promise from a friend not only to do something at a future
time but to treat the request as irrevocable, and then the later self,
having recovered his calm and thought the matter over, asks to revoke the earlier request. Once more, to honor the later request over
the earlier would not be to violate the autonomy of the whole person
over time.
The hardest case is that in which the conflicting decisions of earlier and later selves appear to be equally voluntary. Which takes
precedence then? The answer to which we are committed by our
38 HOMER, THE ODYSSEY OF HOMER, Book XII, 36-58, 144-200. In the verse translation
of Richmond Lattimore (New York: Harper and Row, 1965), the passages are on pages 18690.
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discussion so far seems to favor the earlier self in that case, but we
shall have to retest that answer against intuitively difficult examples.
First, however, I shall restate the position toward which a theory of
personal sovereignty seems to incline us. Where the earlier self in a
fully voluntary way renounced his right to revoke in the future (or
during some specified future interval), or explicitly instructed another, as in the Odyssean example, not to accept contrary instructions from the future self, then the earlier choice, being the genuine
choice of a sovereign being free to dispose of his own lot in the future,
must continue to govern. After all, the earlier self and the later are
identically the same self, not morally distinct persons, but rather one
person at different times. Talk of "the earlier self" and "the later
self' is only a usefulfacon deparler. If it is taken literally as referring
to two distinct beings, it can only generate mystery and confusion, for
then we shall have no way of explaining how one fully autonomous
person can bind another fully autonomous person without the latter's
consent. All of our ordinary notions of responsibility, as well as such
basic moral practices as promise-making, presuppose a relation of
personal identity between earlier and later stages of the same self.
Without that presupposition, very little of the idea of personal autonomy can be salvaged either. If I am not free to forfeit future liberties
for present benefit, my lifelong "supply" of liberties may thus be
maximized (against my present will), but since I am not permitted to
decide, now, on how liberties and other benefits are to be distributed
over the future course of my life, the domain of my self-government
has been diminished severely in its temporal dimensions, and the de
facto "freedom" left to my future selves may seem small compensation (especially since I shall pass on to them my present frustrations
and resentments).
We could leave the matter at that and proceed to our next business, but caution dictates that we pause first, and examine the case
39
It
for the other side. What does the contrary argument look like?

employs, in the first place, a quite different conception of personal
identity. On its terms, when an earlier self voluntarily agrees or resolves that his later self do something and that the agreement be irrevocable, and his later self, equally voluntarily, wishes to revoke the
earlier agreement, the case is not always to be treated as one sovereign person "changing his mind" later, but at least sometimes as a
39 For the best statement of such an argument, see Donald Regan, Fatemalism, Freedom,
Identiy, and Commitment, in PATERNALISM (University of Minnesota Press, R. Sartorius ed.
1983 forthcoming).
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close conflict between two equally sovereign persons. Not every
"later self," of course, simply in virtue of being later than an earlier
one, is therefore distinct in identity from that earlier one, but only a
later self who has undergone a thorough sea-change of basic values.
The seller who, after an interval of a year, comes to think that his
earlier irrevocable agreement not to reopen a business in competition
with the purchaser was unwise is not on that ground alone a "different person" from the man who made the original agreement. A convicted murderer, however, who after seven years on Death Row has
acquired an education, achieved genuine repentance, and reconstructed his personality and character, might well be described seriously (and not just as afafon deparler) as "not the same person" as the
vicious savage who committed the murder seven years earlier.
The second part of the case against irrevocability where earlier
and later selves conflict would be to invent or discover convincing
examples for which the "two distinct sovereign selves" interpretation
seems plausible. Donald Regan proposes several examples of distinct
personal identities that seem unconvincing to me if only because the
"changes of mind" involved do not seem sufficiently thorough. He
suggests that in restraining a would-be smoker we protect another person, namely, his later self, who having contracted lung cancer, may
have renounced his earlier habit and become thereby, for moral purposes, "a different man." AgainWhat about the [motor] cyclist who rides without a helmet?
What makes her a different person after her accident? The answer,
I think, is that the cyclist is a different person, in the relevant respect, if she is no longer the sort of person who would ignore her
future well-being for the sake of small increments of personal utility. Of course it is not certain that having the accident will produce
any such change in the cyclist. But it seems likely to. In many
cases, I should think, the cyclist will not merely wish she had behaved differently in the past. She will have a new appreciation of
the virtue of prudence and will alter her attitude toward risk in the
future. If the cyclist changes in this way, then she is a different
person, who deserves protection against the foolish behavior of her
earlier self.4°
Of course, the cyclist is not literally a different person after her accident. Even Regan would admit that she does not get a new name, a
new license, a new police record, that her marriage is not annulled,
and her debts are not cancelled. She is a different person, Regan
suggests, in "some respects" or "for some purposes" but not for
40 Id (pagination unavailable).
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others. But this seems mere word play if it means no more than "she
used to be reckless but now that she has been hurt she sees the point
of being more careful and has become more careful." In every other
way, including deep and important ways, she is still the same old
Mary Jones. It is one thing to tell the earlier Mary Jones that she
must be forced to do what she doesn't want to in order to protect a
second party, but quite another to justify the interference in that language while meaning only that if or when she becomes more prudent
she will not or would not regret the interference. The more overtly
paternalistic language seems much less contrived and more honest.
Even the example of the reformed murderer, in whom deep and
pervasive character changes have occurred, fails to be convincing,
and for still another reason. Certain important descriptions of the
gentle sensitive person in Death Row presuppose for their intelligibility an identity with the savage beast who earlier committed a murder,
and a continuity of development of the same self. If he is "reformed," for example, he has changed himself in centrally important
ways from what he used to be, and that is quite another thing than
dying and being reborn. Genuine repentance as well as such states as
contrition, remorse, the feeling of guilt, and the desire for atonement,
all require some sense of continuity with the past and self-identity
with an earlier wrongdoer. The essence of these states is the deliberate taking of responsibility for an earlier doing. To deny one's identity
with the wrongdoer is to evade or deny responsibility for his crimes,
quite another thing from repentance. When multiple murderer Paul
Crump's death sentence was commuted to life imprisonment without
possibility of parole, Illinois Governor Kerner wrote, "The embittered, distorted man who committed a vicious murder no longer exists. . . . Under these circumstances it would serve no useful
purpose to take this man's life. . . ." I take that to be a rhetorical

embittered and
way of saying that since Paul Crump is no longer
41
distorted, there is no good reason to take his life.
The closest thing to a persuasive example of changed personal
identity is also the most ingenious one, that invented by Derek Parfit
in his much discussed paper Later Selves andMoral Princz'les.42 Parfit's
example is also directly relevant to our present purposes since it involves an irrevocable commitment binding on an unwilling later self:
41 See R. Bailey, FacingDeath, A New Life Perhaps Too Late, LIFE, July 27, 1962, at 28-29,
reprintedin PHILOSOPHY AND THE HUMAN CONDITION 324 (T. Beauchamp, W. Blackstone &
J. Feinberg eds. 1980).
42 D. Parfit, Later Selves and Moral Principles, in PHILOSOPHY AND PERSONAL RELATIONS
137-69 (A. Montefiore ed. 1973).
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Let us take a 19th century Russian who, in several years, should
inherit vast estates. Because he has socialist ideals, he intends, now,
to give the land to the peasants. But he knows that in time his
ideals may fade. To guard against this possibility, he does two
things. He first signs a legal document, which will automatically
give away the land, and which can only be revoked with his wife's
consent. He then says to his wife, "If I ever change my mind, and
ask you to
revoke the document, promise me that you will not
43
consent."1

We can imagine then that "Boris" (the name provided by Donald
Regan) does undergo a change as he grows older, and eventually
abandons his socialist ideals for more conservative (and self-serving)
principles, just as his earlier self had feared. When he finally inherits
the estates, he implores his bewildered wife to consent to a revocation
of the earlier agreement. If she stands firm she will be honoring her
solemn promise to the earlier Boris; if she gives in, she will retroactively restrict the earlier Boris' liberty to determine his own lot in life.
The early Boris, when he made his agreement with her, was in
deadly earnest, acting on his principles, freely, with his eyes wide
open to the possible consequences. "The root idea of autonomy,"
says Arneson, "is that in making a voluntary choice a person takes on
responsibility for all the foreseeable consequences to himself that flow
from this voluntary choice." 44 If Mrs. Boris reneges she will be releasing Boris from responsibility for his fully voluntary and autonomous commitment. On the other hand, the later Boris has also
chosen voluntarily. His request too is a genuine reflection of his governing principles. Why should he, an autonomous person, be governed, he asks, by the dead hand of an earlier self who no longer
45
exists? What then should Mrs. Boris do?
Mrs. Boris put herself under a solemn obligation when she freely
made the promise while well aware of the risks. Boris waived his
right at that time to release her, so his subsequent change of mind
cannot nullify her duty. Even on Regan's theory of personal identity, the duty stands, for even if the early Boris is now dead, the
promise once made to him is still in force. Obviously, promises can
remain in force after the death of the promisor; otherwise, how can
43 Id at 145.
44 Arneson, supra note 37, at 475.
45 It is too late for Mrs. Boris to refuse to make a promise or to argue that her husband
put her in an unreasonable position when he extracted the promise in the first place. For the
sake of the example, let us suppose that young Mrs. Boris shared her husband's strong socialist
convictions and willingly played her role in supporting them. It is morally irrelevant whether
the old Mrs. Boris has changed her political beliefs.
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we account for the moral incumbency of wills and insurance policies?
But Boris is not dead; he is simply different-very, very different, to
be sure, but different in precisely the ways the young Boris foresaw as
a danger when he resigned his right ever to release the promisor. The
contingency that provided the whole reason for the irrevocability
clause in the first place can hardly be invoked after the fact as the
reason for revoking. The commitment then remains binding, and
Mrs. Boris' duty is plain.
Perhaps, nevertheless, Mrs. Boris ought to relent, and deliberately decline to do her duty, out of pity, or from simple humanity.
Renouncing an obligation is a morally serious thing, not to be done
routinely whenever performance would lead to hardship. In extreme
cases, however, after giving due weight to honor, the sanctity of
agreements, and the necessity of trust, it may be true that a person,
albeit with grave misgivings and deep reluctance, ought to renounce
a genuine obligation. In these cases, it does not follow that the
rightly renounced obligation could not have been a true obligation in
the first place.4 6 It much better serves the cause of moral clarity to
call a spade a spade. To invent a theory of personal identity that
permits one to say that the later self is not the same self as that to
whom the promise was made, is to evade responsibility for what one
is doing. Candor requires that one confess that one has broken faith
with a promisee because in the circumstances other factors had even
more weight than fidelity. There is more to morality than the legalistic realm of rights and duties, central as that realm is. If Mrs. Boris'
refusal to consent to revocation would plunge Boris into permanent
and severe misery, then that fact is a reason for relenting, though it
will be very difficult for Mrs. Boris to determine whether it is a decisive reason. Hers is a hard decision, but the problem is better described as a conflict between her plain obligation and other types of
moral reasons rather than as a conflict between obligations.
Mrs. Boris' dilemma is very much like that we all face when the
"born losers" in society, having gambled irrevocably with their own
futures in some way, and lost, must either be rescued, or allowed to
pay the full cost of their earlier recklessness. In Boris' case, and in
that of the hypothetical "voluntary slave" who repents of his earlier
irrevocable contract, to intervene contrary to the earlier commitment
would be inconsistent with respect for personal autonomy. But the
alternative, to stand by powerless to prevent abject suffering-to let
46

See my Supererogationand Rules, in DOING AND DESERVING 4-9 (1970).
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the loser sleep in his own bed or stew in his own juices-may be
inhumane to such a degree that it cannot rightly be done.
C.

ConstitutionalPrivacy

The United States Supreme Court in recent years appears to
have discovered a basic constitutional right suggestive of our "sovereign personal right of self-determination," and has given it the highly
misleading name of "the right to privacy." Descriptions of the right
vary from case to case, but one common element it seems to share
with "personal sovereignty" is the notion that there is a domain in
which the individual's own choice must reign supreme.4 7 On the
boundaries of this "zone" is a "wall" against state interference: in
respect to protected choices, "the state shall make no law ....
The first criminal statute to be invalidated by the Court on the
ground that it penetrated the protected zone was a Connecticut statute prohibiting the use "by any person" of contraceptives, and permitting any doctor who counsels their use to be prosecuted and
punished as if he were the principal offender. In the famous case of
Griswoldv. Connecticut,48 in which Dr. Griswold and another physician
associated with the Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut appealed their convictions for counseling birth control, all the justices
agreed with Justice Stewart that this statute was (at the least) "an
uncommonly silly law," but there was some hesitation about striking
it down since there is no explicitly named right in the Constitution
that it could plausibly be said to contravene. Justices Stewart and
Black found "uncommon silliness" to be an insufficient ground for
unconstitutionality and dissented from the majority who found the
right of privacy implied, though not explicitly named or defined, by
various constitutional guarantees.
47 The territorial metaphor is spelled out quite explicitly by Milton R. Konvitz, who
writes of constitutional privacy:
Its essence is the claim that there is a sphere of space that has not been dedicated to public use or control. It is kind of space that a man may carry with him,
into his bedroom or into the street. Even when public, it is a part of the inner man;
it is part of his "property."
M. Konvitz, Pn'vaqy and the Law.- A PhilosophicalPrelude, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 279-80
(1966). Thomas Emerson takes the idea of a privileged zone further:
It [the right to privacy] seeks to assure the individual a zone in which to be an
individual, not a member of the community. In that zone he can think his own
thoughts, have his own secrets, live his own life, reveal only what he wants to the
outside world. The right of privacy, in short, establishes an area excluded from the
collective life, not governed by the rules of collective living.
T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 545 (1970).
48 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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Justice Douglas offered an explanation of how the unnamed
right was "implied" by the explicit ones. As I interpret him, the explanation has two parts. In the first place, the implied right is a necessary condition for the fulfillment of the explicit right; and secondly,
the unnamed right is presupposed by the only coherent rationale that
can be provided for the explicit right. Thus, we could have no effective right of free speech, unless in addition to the right to utter or to
print (that is, the explicit core right), we also had "the right to distribute, the right to receive, the right to read and freedom of inquiry,
freedom of thought, and freedom to teach. . . ."49 These implied
rights are a long way from the strict letter of the law, but without
them constitutional rights would not be such powerful guarantees
and the shrunken core rights themselves, like "free speech," would be
insecure. Without the peripheral rights, moreover, the core right
would stand stripped of coherent rationale or explanation. Justice
Douglas then pointed to other examples of rights not named in the
Bill of Rights but without which the explicit rights would lack meaning or sense. In a metaphor that is now famous he referred to the
"penumbra" (shadowy area) surrounding each explicit right in
which implied rights may (or must) be inferred.
In Justice Douglas' usage, the Constitution contains various
"zones" (note the plural) of privacy, each implied by a primary right
as part of its "penumbra." Justice Douglas' examples indicate that
he means by "zone of privacy" simply zone of individual discretion.
The individual's right of association creates a zone in which he and
only he may decide with whom he shall associate or affiliate; his
fourth amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures
implies his exclusive right to live as he pleases within his own home.
At other places Justice Douglas speaks as if there were one zone of
privacy, perhaps that formed by the complicated intersection of the
various enumerated discretionary rights. In any case the right of
married couples to their own sex lives and procreational decisions
"lies within the zone of privacy created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees. ' 50 Presumably, free speech, free association,
and the security of the home, among others, would make less sense,
and be less secure, without it.
Justice Douglas then turns to another line of argument that not
only seems to undercut the first but shows why the penumbral right
established by the first is not well named "the right of privacy." He
49
50

Id at 482.
Id at 485.
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points out that the Connecticut statute is overbroad in any case. He
seems to concede implicitly, as the remainder of his colleagues grant
explicitly, that "safeguarding marital fidelity" is a proper state purpose, and that arguendo, there is some "rational," that is, plausibly
inferred, connection between that purpose and the statute in question. But even granted all that, Justice Douglas writes that "a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally
subject to state regulation may not be achieved by means which
sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms."' 5 1 Douglas questioned whether "we [would] allow
the police to search the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of contraceptives. ' 52 Certainly that would be a
violation ofpnivag in the familiar everyday sense of the word! But
Justice Douglas implies that this constitutional deficiency would be
avoided by a statute that did not forbid the use of contraceptives, but
only regulated their manufacture or sale. 53 That alternative statute
could be enforced without any peeking into private chambers. As
the least intrusive way of implementing a "legitimate" state purpose,
Justice Douglas may be implying, such a statute would not violate
marital privacy.
In effectively preventing married couples from using contraceptive devices, however, the less intrusive legislation would infringe the
autonomy of married couples, and diminish their capacity to decide
for themselves in what would otherwise be a zone of discretion, that
of choices related to marital sexual intimacies and reproductive decisions. That zone of sovereignty has nothing to do with privacy in the
ordinary sense (a liberty to enjoy one's solitude unwitnessed, unintruded upon, even unknown about in certain ways); but it is central
to the constitutional doctrine of privacy-as-autonomy that Justice
Douglas had seemed to be working out in his first line of argument.
If he had continued on his first path, he would have declared even
the less intrusive hypothetical legislation to be a violation of marital
autonomy, and he would have taken a much more skeptical look at
the allegedly "proper state purpose" it would so economically subserve. Justice Goldberg, in his concurring opinion, emphasizes the
argument from unnecessary intrusion and even concedes that "[t]he
State of Connecticut does have statutes, the constitutionality of
which is beyond doubt, which prohibit adultery and fornication.
51

Id (quoting NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307 (1964)).

52 Id
53

Id
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These statutes," he adds, "demonstrate that means for achieving the
basic purpose of protecting marital fidelity are available to Connecticut without the need to 'invade the area of protected freedoms.'
The logic of this passage implies that the constitutional right of marital privacy, for Justice Goldberg, covers only the right to be unintruded upon, unwitnessed, and undisclosed in one's solitude, that is,
privacy in the familiar pre-technical sense. The deeper right to discretionary control, so reminiscent of dejure autonomy, which was suggested at the beginning of Justice Douglas' opinion, by that route
goes down the drain. I suspect that if the word "autonomy" had
been used in the first place, instead of "privacy," the dangers of
equivocation would have been obviated, and these confusions
avoided.
If there is truly a doctrine of personal autonomy in recent
Supreme Court decisions under the label of "privacy," what are the
boundaries of the posited autonomous domain? For a time, the line
of decisions following Griswold and extending its right of privacy to
new areas encouraged many liberal observers to suspect that the "privacy" protected by the Court was really personal autonomy, and its
domain boundaries those determined by the self-and-other-regarding
distinction, just as John Stuart Mill might have wished. The right to
marital privacy bestowed in Griswold was extended in Eisenstadt v.
",54

Baird55 from married to unmarried couples. In Loving v. Virginia,56 it

was used to strike down the miscegenation statutes used by southern
states since the Civil War to restrict the right to marry whomever one
wishes, regardless of race. In Stanley v. Georgia,57 the right to privacy
54

Id at 498 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (quoting NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307

(1964)).
55 405 U.S. 438 (1972). In Eisenstad/, the Supreme Court invalidated a Massachusetts
statute that prohibited distributing contraceptives to unmarried persons. The Court held
that the statute's separate treatment of married and unmarried persons violated the equal
protection clause.
56 388 U.S. 1 (1967). The State of Virginia had banned interracial marriages by statute.
Mildred Jeter, a Negro woman, and Richard Loving, a white man, were married in the District of Columbia and then moved to Virginia. The Supreme Court reversed their convictions pursuant to this statute on the basis of both the equal protection clause and the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment. The Court concluded that the fourteenth
amendment requires that the freedom of choice to marry not be restricted by invidious racial
discrimination.
57 394 U.S. 557 (1969). Mr. Stanley was indicted and convicted for possessing obscene
films, which were confiscated from his bedroom pursuant to a search warrant for bookmaking
activity. He argued that the Georgia obscenity statute, insofar as it punished mere private
possession of obscene matter, violated the first amendment. The Supreme Court agreed with
Stanley and reversed his conviction. The Court recognized as a fundamental right the right
to be free from unwarranted government intrusion into one's privacy.
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discovered in Griswold was held to support the sanctity of the home,
including the right to witness pornographic movies in one's own bedroom. In Moore v. East Cleveland,5 the Court struck down zoning restrictions on the rights of extended families to live together in a single
dwelling. In Roe v. Wade 59 the Court granted to all pregnant women
the discretionary right, derived from the right of privacy, to decide
whether to continue or to terminate their own pregnancies, free from
repressive criminal legislation, at least in the first two trimesters.
The decisions take a zig-zag path, but they do exhibit a pattern.
The zone of privacy is extended from the essential intimacies of the
marital relation, to heterosexual intimacies generally, to decisions
about whom to marry, to decisions about "family planning," childrearing, modes of family living, and finally to decisions about the
termination of pregnancy. One feature these various rights seem to
have in common is that they are concerned with areas of individual
and collective (family) conduct that are essentially self-regarding in
Mill's sense.60 "From the first, the Court's development of a right to
privacy has suggested to philosophically minded commentators the
possible elevation to constitutional status of Mill's principle of liberty," wrote one philosophically minded commentator; 61 but as it
turned out his enthusiasm was premature, for the Court then did a
turnabout, and in a series of illiberal decisions, ruled that privacy
does not extend to couples living in "open adultery," or to certain
self-regarding but idiosyncratic life-styles, or to the use and cultivation of marijuana even in the "sanctity" of one's own home, or to the
consensual viewing of pornographic films in places of public accommodation, or to the length and style of policemen's hair, or to homo58 431 U.S. 494 (1977). In Moore, a city zoning ordinance specified the categories of relatives that could live together. The ordinance made it a crime for a grandchild to live with his
grandparent. A grandmother, Mrs. Moore, was convicted of a violation when she failed to
remove her grandson from her home. The Supreme Court reversed, holding the ordinance
violated the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. The governmental interests
advanced and the extent to which they were served by the ordinance were insufficient to
uphold the ordinance.
59 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Roe was a class action brought by a pregnant woman to challenge the Texas abortion laws, which allowed abortion only to save the mother's life. The
Supreme Court held that the statute violated the fourteenth amendment's due process clause
because it was an invasion of privacy (which includes the right to terminate pregnancy).
60 Of course, if the fetus is a person with its own right to life, then the decision to terminate pregnancy is not a wholly self-regarding one, hence not within the zone of the pregnant
woman's sovereignty. The crucial issue in the abortion controversy is not a legal one, or even
a primarily moral one, but a metaphysical (or conceptual) issue, one about the status of the
fetus.
61

THOMAS C. GREY, THE LEGAL ENFORCEMENT OF MORALITY (New York: Random

House, 1983 forthcoming) (pagination unavailable).
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sexual intercourse between consenting adults in private. Now liberal
critics, stripped of their earlier hopes, charged that the Court was
arbitrary and erratic in its mapping of domain boundaries and that
"once it began to protect the rights of 'consenting adults' in Griswold,
it could not without gross and apparent inconsistency stop short of
'62
reading into the Constitution some version of Mill's principle.
A closer reading of the opinions even in the earlier favorable
cases, however, would not have encouraged the hope that a doctrine
of personal sovereignty with Millian domain boundaries was being
read into the United States Constitution. It is true that the right of
privacy discovered in the penumbra of primary constitutional rights
is meant to be a personal autonomy and not merely "privacy" in the
more accustomed sense of rightful solitude or anonymity. But the
interpretations of the right by the judges who discovered it would
have disappointed Mill in at least two ways: their notion of what is a
"proper state purpose," and their definitions of domain boundaries.
The Court at the time of Griswold had long since endorsed a formula
for balancing restrictive legislation against individual rights. The
personal liberties involved are either relatively unimportant or else
"fundamental." (Undoubted constitutional guarantees like free
speech and free exercise of religion are clearly fundamental.) If the
encroachment by the statute on personal liberties is relatively insignificant, or the liberty itself rot fundamental, then the offending statute will pass constitutional muster provided only that (1) it is meant
to effect some legitimate state purpose, and (2) it has some "rational
relationship" to the achievement of that purpose, that is, that there is
some minimally plausible, even if unproven and unlikely, instrumental connection with that purpose. The test is much stricter, however,
when the liberty restricted is a fundamental one (as the constitutional right to privacy may be presumed to be). In that case the state
interest must be more than "proper"; it must be compelling. And the
statute's relationship to that purpose must be more than "rational";
it must be necessary. The Connecticut anti-contraceptive statute
clearly was not necessary for achieving its avowed purpose, but that
purpose, the discouragement of adultery, Justice Douglas implies,
and Justice Goldberg states (in an opinion joined by Chief Justice
Warren and Justice Brennan), is a legitimate state policy. 6 3
(Goldberg does not say that the state interest in marital fidelity is
"compelling," and implies that it is not, but nevertheless he finds the
62 Id
63

Griswold, 381 U.S. at 498.
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constitutionality of criminal statutes prohibiting adultery and forni'64
cation "beyond doubt. )
In an earlier Connecticut birth control case, Poe v. Ullman,65 Justice Harlan, in a manner that would please Lord Devlin more than
Mill, also concedes in a dissenting opinion the legitimacy of a state
interest in the "moral welfare of its citizenry," and speaks with cautious tolerance of Connecticut's view that the morality of its citizens
may be protected "both directly, in that it considers the practice of
contraception immoral in itself, and instrumentally, in that the availability of contraceptive materials tends to minimize 'the disastrous
consequences of dissolute [adulterous] action' "66 (presumably venereal disease and unwanted pregnancy). He makes it plain that even
the right of privacy may be restricted where necessary to promote a
legitimate state interest. "Thus, I would not suggest that adultery,
homosexuality, fornication, and incest are immune from criminal enquiry, however privately practiced .... -67 What is the difference
between these regulations and those that are barred by the right of
privacy? Harlan answers thus:
It is one thing when the State exerts its power either to forbid extramarital sexuality altogether, or to say who may marry, but it is
quite another when, having acknowledged a marriage and the intimacies inherent in it, it undertakes to regulate
by means of the
68
criminal law the details of that intimacy.
Justice Harlan then, and most of his colleagues and successors,
recognized the very anti-Millian interest in "enforcing the requirements of decency" as a constitutionally legitimate one so long as it is
not pressed unnecessarily beyond the proper boundaries of privacy.
Other justices on the Court have drawn those boundaries rather
more widely than Justice Harlan. But I have found none who has
boldly employed the Millian formula. It is not simply in virtue of
being primarily self-regarding that decisions involving marital sex
and family planning fall within the zone of constitutional privacy. If
that were all, then decisions whether to wear protective helmets, seat
belts, and life preservers would be similarly protected. Rather, the
Court, in its various ways, has circumscribed as "private" those decisions that involve the most basic of the self-regarding decisions. Chief
64 Id
65 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
66 Id at 545 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
67 Id at 552 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
68 Id at 553 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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Justice Burger summarized the earlier decisions accurately in 1973
when he stated that privacy envelops "only personal rights that can
be deemed 'fundamental' or 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.' This privacy right encompasses and protects the personal intimacies of the home, the family, marriage, motherhood, procreation,
and child rearing .... -69 It encompasses use of pornography in
one's home, but not drug taking even in one's home (a difficult distinction), and not voluntarily watching "obscene movies in places of
public accommodation. ' 70 The boundary line, in short, tends to follow, however erratically, the line of those liberties which are most
fecund, those exercised in the pivotally central life decisions and
thereby underlying and supporting all the others.
As we have seen, one could similarly draw more narrowly the
boundaries of the domain of personal sovereignty. There could well
be some advantages in such a conception over the "self-and-other
regarding" test of more orthodox liberalism. The liberal could then
abandon his quarrel with the paternalist over relatively trivial safety
restrictions such as requirements that seat belts or life preservers be
worn in the appropriately dangerous circumstances. But instead of
arguing like Gerald Dworkin that "[i]n the final analysis.

. .

we are

justified in making sailors take along life preservers because this minimizes the risk of harm to them at the cost of a trivial interference
with their freedom," 7 ' the liberal could argue that such interference
is no infringement whatever of personal sovereignty since domain
boundaries are not drawn around all primarily self-regarding choices
but only those self-regarding critical life-choices that "determine
one's lot in life." In that way the liberal can take his stand on such
issues as marriage and career choices, experimental life styles, food
and drug use, sexual freedom, dangerous sports that play a central
part in the life plans of some people (e.g., mountain climbing), suicide, and euthanasia. He can argue for an inviolable personal sovereignty that is not affected by minor safety regulations because he has
drawn the boundaries of the sovereign domain more narrowly so as
69 Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 65 (1973) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut,
302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)). The State of Georgia sued for a civil injunction to stop the showing of two allegedly obscene films. The Georgia Supreme Court found that the films were
obscene and therefore fell outside the protection of the first amendment. Georgia's civil standards, however, did not conform to the Supreme Court's obscenity test established in Miller
v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). The Supreme Court remanded the case for proceedings
consistent with Miller.
70 Id at 66.
71 Gerald Dworkin, Paternalism: Some Second Thoughts, in PATERNALISM (University of
Minnesota Press, R. Sartorius ed. 1983 forthcoming) (pagination unavailable).
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to protect only the life choices that matter, those whose manner of
exercise reflects the kind of self the person is in some essential and
fundamental way. This move would be analogous to drawing the
off-shore limits of national sovereignty at three miles instead of
twelve or fifteen. An international fishing treaty by which all signatories accept a three mile limit would not be a violation of national
sovereignty, not even a "small" or "insignificant" one. Sovereignty
would still be sacrosanct and unviolated unless (say) a given small
country is forced by a powerful fishing nation to agree unilaterally to
a line drawn in its case twelve miles interior to the shore. That might
be analogous to a statutory regulation of marriage choices or private
sexual conduct, and no amount of juggling with definitions of domain boundaries could justify it.
Perhaps there is a strategy here for the tired liberal theorist who
does not wish to quarrel over such trivial issues as seat belts, but does
not want to abandon his basic principles either. But it is a strategy
full of hazards and difficulties. Many writers have complained that
Mill's self-and-other-regarding test is a difficult one to make precise
and workable, 72 but its difficulties are minor compared to those involved in giving application to the criterion of "central," "pivotal,"
or "fecund" interests, or those "inseparable from the concept of ordered liberty," or those that express a person in "some essential and
important way." As the experience of the Supreme Court has shown,
it is difficult to apply a restricted concept of personal sovereignty in
ways that do not seem arbitrary. (So, for example, our "privacy"
permits us to view pornography in our own homes, but not to use
forbidden drugs there, and it includes heterosexual but not homosexual relations between consenting adults in private.) The correlative
of vagueness in a criterion is arbitrariness in its application.
Again, individual differences create great problems for the narrower boundary lines. Perhaps most motorcyclists who prefer not to
wear helmets think of that preference simply as a matter of comfort
and convenience. An imposed minor inconvenience is, as Dworkin
put it, "a trivial interference with their freedom." There may be
many others, however, for whom motorcycle expeditions are essential
elements in a chosen life-style, and who view helmets as hated symbols of the nitpicking prudence they emphatically reject as they take
to the open road, spirits soaring, their hair blowing in the wind. Can
72 For thorough discussions of these charges, and interpretations or reinterpretations of
Mill's self-and-other-regarding distinction, see J.C. Rees, A Re-reading of Mill on Libery, 8
POLITICAL STUDIES 113-29 (1960), and C.L. TEN, MILL ON LIBERTY 10-41 (1980).
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we justify permitting others their dangerous adventures in racing cars
and on mountain slopes, yet deny the motorcylist his romantic flair?
Without trying to settle all the vexatious questions raised by
mandatory safety regulations, I can emphasize here the point that if
a philosopher is operating with a concept of dejure autonomy, and
not mere de facto liberty or freedom, he may not compromise as
Dworkin does, and balance "trivial interferences" against great increases in safety. There is no such thing as a "trivial interference"
with personal sovereignty; nor is it simply another value to be
weighed in a cost-benefit comparison. In this respect, if not others, a
trivial interference with sovereignty is like a minor invasion of virginity: the logic of each concept is such that a value is respected in its
entirety or not at all.
I, for one, would be pleased if we could find such an absolute
value in the United States Constitution, though I admit that the consequences of absoluteness are so sobering that perhaps a prudent
judge should hesitate. On the other hand, if the privacy concept already attributed to the Constitution is not identical to personal sovereignty, what can it be?

